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Computational virtuality is introduced as a key distinguishing feature of genuinely
computational systems. Evidence is provided that the basic cellular machinery possesses
virtuality. Accordingly, one can step beyond the commonplace metaphor of computation
as applied to molecular biology, and come to view the cell as a genuine computing system.
The human nervous system is analyzed in the same light, setting an agenda for research on
virtuality in recurrent neural networks, whose outcomes in the way of theoretical results
and simulation of biological neural systems may heuristically guide neuroscientists in the
search for virtual computing in the brain.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Computing and biological systems meet nowadays in a number of different ways and directions.
In one of these directions, biological inspiration drives the search for computational systems with desirable
characteristics of natural systems, such as robustness or self-repair. Notable examples include neural networks, evolutionary
algorithms and genetic programs, membrane computing, and ant-computing. In the opposite direction, computation is
applied to natural systems. This is done in an instrumental or heuristic way; examples include datamining of accrued results
in Bioinformatics, plain data processing in experiments, computational modeling as an epistemic tool. An intermediate
position is occupied by description formalisms [10] or simulation languages for biological systems (e.g. BioSPI) [3,5]. And
then biological systems are made to compute, as in DNA computing [1] or in various forms of RNA-nanotechnology [17].
We argue in this paper that some biological systems, namely the central nervous systems of higher species including
Homo, and the cell machinery1 are themselves computational in nature, rather than just metaphorically so. In order to
step beyond the commonplace and fairly uncontroversial metaphor of computation as applied to nervous systems and
to molecular biology, we analyze virtuality as a key feature of computation, and provide evidence that nervous systems
and cellular machinery do possess virtuality. On this evidential basis it is then argued that nervous systems and cellular
machinery are bona fide computational systems.
2. Algorithms, computations, and virtuality
Discreteness and finiteness, as well as determinism and compositionality, are deemed to be essential characteristics of
the notion of algorithm.We propose to consider them as important, but not characterizing, with respect to themore general
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1 We consider very basic, unicellular biological entities. Metazoa, except for their nervous systems, or Plantae will not be considered, even if in the latter
control (taxes, tropisms, etc.) and perhaps computational behaviour are certainly present.
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concept of computing as used in the varieties of computations mentioned in the Introduction. Following a recent paper co-
authored by one of us, [43], we will consider virtuality, rather than discreteness and finiteness conditions, as the hallmark
of computation. Virtuality endows physical entities with some sort of ‘‘immaterial’’ or ‘‘as if’’ capability, consisting of the
substitution of the actualmachinery by its (code) description. This feature appears to be an unexpected discovery behind the
usual, historical connotation of the algorithm. We will then distinguish between ‘algorithmic’ and ‘computational’ where
the latter term includes the denotation of the former, but not vice versa.
While the terms ‘virtual’ and ‘virtuality’ are frequently used nowadays in Computer Science, a precise definition is
lacking2 and one usually describes types of virtual behaviour and types of entities which exhibit virtual behaviour by appeal
to a cluster of closely related features.
These are features that jointly enable the capability of interpreting, storing, transforming, and creating computer program
code. Historically, this is evident from the context of use of the notions of virtual memory and virtual hardware that were
introduced to describe the IBM/360machines of the 1960s, and the related terminology ofmultiplemachine,multiple virtual
space, multiple address space, etc. The notion of virtual machine, as it occurs in the domain of Operating Systems, and the
Java virtual machine are rooted in this cluster of features too.
It is quite surprising that hardly any reference is made in these computer architecture and programming language
contexts to the theoretical underpinning of virtuality in computability theory.
Therefore we define virtuality as the property of an abstract computing scheme, and of a physical computational system
as well, such that:
(0) there exists an effective encoding of the elements of the scheme or of the system;
(1) the codes provided by such encoding can be applied to specific elements, designated as universal (or interpreters), such
that the universal element realizes the behaviour of the coded element;
(2) the codes can be processed by the elements of the system on a par with the input and output variables.
Thus, according to clause (1), we take virtuality to encompass the normal form or enumeration theorems of the theory of
partial recursive functions together with the existence of the Universal Turing machine; while further results of the theory,
notably the S-m-n and Recursion theorems, justify clause (2) insofar as they are concerned with recursive, hence effectively
computable, functions which process codes of another (in diagonal cases the same) function.
While the above definition arises within the theory of effective computability, we do not constrain the physical
computational systems to abide by the conventional algorithmic conditions, butwe apply the definition to generic dynamical
systems which we will then deem to be computational in our extended sense when they satisfy our definition and are
therefore endowed with virtuality (Fig. 1).
We call the capability expressed by clause (1) forward virtuality, and the second one backward virtuality. These
qualifications of virtuality stem fromHartley Rogers’ treatment [35] of numberings for the partial recursive functions. On the
one hand, the notion of semi-effective numbering introduced by Rogers is renamed direct or forward numbering [42], insofar
as a semi-effective numbering is an effective (i.e. computable) map from the integers into the partial recursive functions. It
is forward because one can go from the (code-)number to the values of the function. Indeed, to any forward numbering is
associated a normal form for the partial recursive functions or, equivalently, the given normal form describes the numbering.
Backward numberings, on the other hand, have been defined as partial recursive functions numberings such that one can
go effectively from a given function back to one of its numbers. The notion of ‘‘giving a function’’ being effectively (pun
intended) tricky, the S-m-n functions are taken to implement it. This can be understood as follows: given a class of functions
identified by a code and a number of parameters, the S-m-n function effectively selects the function identified by any
particular choice of the parameters. Thus forward numberings are associated with a normal form or universal function;
the backward ones with an S-m-n function. Numberings with both features are fully effective numberings: the usual ones,
also called standard.
The motives for the above qualifications should be clear. Forward virtuality is the capability of executing behaviour
specified by a code or program. Backward virtuality is the capability of recovering and processing a code or program. As
an example consider compilers which provide machine code starting from high level language source specifications.
Flexibility is themore prominent behavioural consequence of virtuality and is in our opinion the fundamental advantage
of a computational system. We are thinking here of active entities and their time behaviours. An active entity with a
fixed structure is behaviourally rigid because its responses to any environmental pattern are rehearsed with no significant
changes over time. An entity with virtuality is flexible, insofar as it may exhibit a variety of different shapes of behaviour
in response to the same environmental input pattern, depending on the program it is executing on its fixed basic structure.
Thus, virtuality exempts from the construction of different material structures in order to obtain different functions or
behaviours, substituting constructionwith a description, namely the code. Furthermore clause (2),which grants processing of
the codes by the elements of the system, thereby grants the capability of virtually constructing or modifying other elements
of the system within the system itself.3We deem interesting to look for such significant features in dynamical systems not
expressly algorithmic.
2 However, in a cognate context, a definition of virtual organization was introduced by Mowshowitz in the early 1990s and appears in [24] p. 31.
3 A capability strongly connected, as is well known, with self-referentiality. Also such capability bodes favourably toward the interpretation (in a
computational milieu) of such biological phenomena as self-maintenance, self-repair, autocatalysis.
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Fig. 1. Physical dynamical systems, computing and otherwise. Systems possessing virtuality (quad) may or may not be algorithmic. However, algorithmic
systems (dots) are always realized, at the bottom, as physical dynamical systems (gates, flip-flops, neurons of the computing brain, etc.). It is debatable
whether such systems as artificial neural networks, genetic algorithms, or simulations of physical or biological systems – in which an algorithmic tool
simulates a dynamical system – should be located, independently of virtuality, within the algorithmic or plain dynamical systems. Notice also that some
algorithmic systems, such as finite state automata, do not possess virtuality, yet are computing entities, while the scheme does not attempt to identify
analog computing. (See Section 5, discussion.)
Clearly, flexibility arises from learning as well. However, there are crucial differences between interpreting and learning,
notably concerning time scales. In interpreting, the switching between different shapes of behaviour takes place on the time
scale of the current running of the system; in learning, some structural modification, taking place at a slower time scale is
needed to enable the switching between different shapes of behaviour.
Recently Sloman and Chrisley [39] suggested that virtuality is crucial to achieve a scientific understanding of
consciousness, insofar as it enables one to describe the relevant behaviour at higher levels of abstraction with respect
to physics or nervous system physiology: ‘‘For that we need to talk about what software engineers would call virtual
information processing machines implemented in those physical machines’’ [39], (p. 141, authors’ emphasis). However, the
actual achievement of virtuality in (conscious) nervous systems is taken for granted, and no analysis of its purportedmaterial
realization is provided there. In contrast with this, we focus on the question whether and how the central nervous system
and the cell machinery are actually endowed with virtuality.
Although virtuality is usually associated with partial recursive functions universality (so-called computational
universality) through the closely related notion of Universal Turing Machine [36] (pp. 22–23, 29–30), this need not be the
case. Virtuality only implies the existence of an effective encoding of a class of elements, or machines of the computational
system, such that clauses (1) and (2) hold for the class. One says that the universal element, or interpreter, is universal for
that class. E.g.: within the primitive recursive functions, Grzegorczyk’s classes En possess, for n ≥ 3, universal functions in
En+1. It is important to distinguish the case of a (small) finite classwhere virtualitymaywell reduce to a table look-up in a set
of special purpose machines, from cases of possibly finite, but very (intractably) large classes where virtual interpretation
maintains its advantage.
Indeed, in the applicative domain, practically all special-purpose computing machinery is realized with a (universal)
microprocessor parametrically settled by a read only memory (ROM).
We therefore propose to extend the notion of computability to include, beside the algorithmic systems, those dynamical
systems which are endowed with virtuality, while considering important, but not discriminating, the conventional
requirements of discreteness and finiteness.
Also the strictly connected notions of code and programmight lose in the case of dynamical systems their connotation of
‘‘instruction following’’, replaced, as in neural networks, by a differentmodus operandi, but without losing their significance
with respect to virtuality.
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3. Virtuality in nervous systems
The conventional functional and computational modeling of nervous systems and cognitive functions, in highly
developed species and particularly in humans, calls for a computational capability whose implementation in real nervous
systems is never investigated. Indeed, neurobiological accounts of behavioural functions are usually aimed at identifying
signaling between neurons and anatomical identification (localization) of brain areas involved in the investigated functions.
A computational realization of these functions calls for a large number of special purpose machines which in part are
independently active, the notion that nervous systems are parallel systems, and in part are selected at any given time by a
combination of previous activity and sensorial stimulation: shortly, a finite state automaton interpretation.
However, there is a wide variety of cognitive functions and behaviours that one can hardly account for on the basis of
such finite state automaton interpretations. These notably include:
(1) Mind reading
(2) Higher order thoughts
(3) Planning in unstructured domains
(4) Mental arithmetic
(5) Natural language performance
(6) Time course of memory traces in imagination
(7) Compositionality in action sequences and body positions
(8) Subconscious and dreaming activities.
The hypothesis of virtuality in central nervous system is strongly appealing in order to account for these various functions
and behaviours. Let us briefly comment on mind reading, higher-order thoughts, and natural language.
• ‘‘Mind reading’’, or ‘‘Theory of Mind’’, denotes the capability of predicting and recognizing the intentions of other
individuals and the consequent determination of their behaviour. Models for Theory of mind in philosophy of mind
or cognitive science maintain that prediction of behaviour in other individuals is performed either by inferring from a
description of their present behaviour a description of a further fragment of this behaviour or by internally enacting
a simulation of how their behaviour evolves. In both cases, some sort of forward or inverse model of the ‘‘other’’ is
apparently needed, except in the most stereotyped and instinctual situations. Moreover, complex species behaviours
are based on a mind reading capability taking advantage of detailed representations of individuals and their behaviours.
A promising strategy towards a functional explanation of thesemind reading capabilities involves the capability of calling
and executing a vast number of different scripts, i.e. programs associatedwith the appropriate situation. But this approach
entails that mind reading systems possess the virtuality property, which enables them to handle and execute different
programs by means of an underlying, flexible computational machinery.
• ‘‘Higher Order Thoughts’’ or thinking about thinking (see [37], p. 249 for a telling discussion) are treated in Cognitive
sciencemostly in functional terms, and often by reference to introspection. However, no suggestion concerning its actual
brain implementation has been ever advanced. By appeal to a computational competence of the brain, which includes
full-fledged virtuality, one would enable one to provide an account in terms of the calling of a procedure within another
procedure and within itself. How differently a computational device could, on the spur of the moment, start processing
over (sections) of its own behaviour? Similar activities also occur in programming practice, mostly in operating systems,
but also in sophisticated artificial intelligence systems such as, e.g., SOAR [27].
• Natural language performance implies the capability of well identified areas of the human cortex to cope with the
production of an a priori unbounded series of sentences and themeans throughwhich such task is accomplished is largely
unknown. However, fixed memory, fixed structure modules seem to be out of the question, and all plausible modeling
uses programmable capabilities, taking for granted virtuality, without even considering the underlying requirements for
it in the basic machinery.
These heuristic motivations for virtuality must be considered in the light of the conundrum of the double location in Fig. 1
of the human central nervous system and humanmental computing. In that figure we classify the human nervous system as
a physical dynamical system endowed with virtuality, while human mental computing is an algorithm, also endowed with
virtuality.
We follow the time honored artificial intelligence assumption that such an algorithm is eventually physically realized,
but with no commitment to the precise nature of the machine realization. The conundrum arises from the observation that,
on the one hand, the actual ‘‘machine realization’’ of human mental computing is the human nervous system, which in no
way resembles a physical system exhibiting the highly reliable discrete behaviour typical of artificial central processing
units (CPU) and, on the other hand, large parts of the repertoire of mental abilities, and therefore of brain behaviour, for
instance tasks (3), (4), and (7) in the list above, at least, plus game playing, formal reasoning, visual processing, etc. have been
successfully duplicated algorithmically, making heavy and natural use of virtuality, as customary in programming practice.
How does the brain do it? While such catchwords as re-entry, signaling, synchronized firing, etc. are still being used in
trying to unravel and explain brain performance, the existence of a huge gap between behaviour and its neurobiological
underpinning is commonly recognized. Recently Dehaene [6] has argued that the vast processing capabilities of the human
brain, including recursion involved in doing mental arithmetic, are not explained in terms of evolutionary adaptation, nor
of learning, and introduced the ‘‘neuronal recycling’’ concept. Other researchers maintain, in contrast with the common
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assumption of topographic identification of functions, that some areas (for instance in the prefrontal cortex) do change kind
of processing (the shape of behaviour) with different tasks. Do they exhibit virtuality?
To sum up: the algorithmic aspect of nervous system computing might well be metaphoric, because brain processing
appears as if itwere algorithmic, butwe do not yet understand how it is achieved. On the other hand, the virtuality capability,
even if not yet more than hypothesized, is literal. Under this view the brain is computational not because neurons resemble
computing elements or because mental behaviour is (also) algorithmic, although those are important pro reasons, but
because it possesses virtuality.
These observations provide powerful motivations for the present search for virtuality both in biological nervous systems
and by proxy in simulated neural networks. The discovery of virtuality in neural systems would put them, according to
our view, into the computability realm. And the suggested functional approaches to the explanation of higher cognitive
capabilities would stand on a firmer basis.
An appealing approach to reconciling the dynamical systems nature of the nervous system with the demands of
virtuality is being pursued through the use of continuous time recurrent neural networks [28]. In continuous time recurrent
networks the outputs of fragments, or layers, of the network may condition other specific parts of the network into variable
behaviours.4 This is reminiscent of theway anoperation code conditions theCPU [7].Where is the programrecorded? It looks
as if the program consists of the parametric biases to neurons – thus fulfilling clause (2) because biases are homogeneous
with inputs – so that execution is plain activity of the network with those parameters.5 So far full fledged programming has
not been properly taken care of. But this sets an agenda for research on virtuality in continuous time recurrent networks,
whose outcomes in theway of theoretical results and applicability to biological nervous systemsmight guide neurobiologists
in the search for virtual computing in the brain.
4. Virtuality in cells
4.1. Forward virtuality: Metabolic pathways and the underlying programmed machine
In Systems Biology [29] it is now customary to treat metabolic, regulatory, and signaling networks as if they were
algorithms or programs.6
Closed and intertwined plain metabolic pathways appear to be instances of multiply nested and looped programs except
that the program appears to be written nowhere. But a step forward in the algorithmic interpretation of pathways is
undertaken here, by taking into account biochemical constraints on the abstract shape (loops, nesting, interconnection
between pathways as co-routines, etc.) of a pathway due to the concentration, possibly timed appearance, diffusion and
Brownian motion, etc. of the chemical species coded for by genic material. The active elements (proteins), because of their
chemical affinities,7 cannot but interact, between themselves and with the extant (intra and extra cellular) environment,
in the way ‘‘designed’’ in the DNA. The latter is a read only memory, which, however, in backward virtuality might be
overwritten or cut and pasted.
Accordingly, we deem that the execution of genic cellular programs consists of gene expression via enzymatic
mechanisms jointly with the further activity induced by the presence of the expressed genes in the cellular matrix. Notice
that the end effect of a program execution, in this specific cellular milieu can be either computational, when the expressed
gene is the condition value of a conditional (see infra), or a structural element, in the sense of the material building of the
cell.
However, the strings of genetic material are not self-operating, autonomous entities. The full cellular machinery appears
to consist of two parts, according to an intuition originally formulated by Günther Stent [41]:
• the sequence of bases of the coding genes or set of interrelated genes, which are viewed as a text specifying the primary
structure of the proteins and, by way of the actual transcription process, its ternary and active structure;
• the basicmachinery of the cell whichwe identifywith theMinimal gene set [13,18] togetherwith the expressed enzymes
coded in the Minimal gene set8 itself.
The latter part, in our opinion, expresses the gist of the somewhat vague intuition of Stent concerning an implicit meaning
inherent in the operation of the cell. This implicit meaning is the capability of a Minimal gene set of running any code,
including its own.
4 Behaviours of continuous time recurrent networks are very fast convergences toward an asymptotic attractors’ landscape.
5 Notice the difference with learning where it is the weights, and not the biases, to be altered.
6 ‘‘The division of cellular networks into metabolism, regulation, and signalling has historical and life science curriculum origin. However, there are an
increasing number of discoveries showing that often the samemolecules participate inmore than one of these networks. Wemust therefore begin to think
of all the chemical reactions resulting from the activities of genomes and gene products as one genome-scale network’’ [29] (p. 46).
7 Affinities act as program’s locations.
8 The necessity of the actual co-existence of both the genic specification of the enzymes and the enzymes themselves is akin to the structural
requirements of the self-reproducing machine by von Neumann [26], a consequence of the 2nd Kleene recursion theorem [36] (pp. 188–190).
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Immediate corroborating examples of this interpretation of the notion of program and its execution in cell machinery
are RNA retroviruses and – promoted by independent interests and through artificial means – cloning and the achievements
of genetic engineering.
In the search of evidence for forward virtuality in cell machinery, we make use of both abstract notions from
computability theory and direct references tomore concrete computer science notions. The reason for this is that the current
CPU-plus-RAM (random access memory) architecture is the main physical realization of effective computing and virtuality,
thus providing a powerful framework to investigate the existence of virtuality in cell machinery. In particular, we now turn
to look for the conditional and its compositionality in cell machinery, insofar as the conditional is a crucial computational
construct for effective computing in general, and computational virtuality in particular. As amatter of fact, simple organisms
can perform regularly the following operations: if the chemical species A is present, then operate to obtain the species B,
else operate to obtain the species C. This can be written as:
if A then B, else C
where C is different from the lack or the inactivity of B (the latter is just the case of the allosteric control, where the regulation
signal is uniquely given by the inducer’s concentration). An example is the ‘‘irreducible complex’’ also known as Lambda’s
switch [34]:
if CII protein is present then code Q protein (lysis9), else code CI protein (lysogeny10)
or at a more fundamental level of evolution, the example of the lac operon of the bacterium Escherichia coli:
if cAMP is present then execute the program lac, else use glucose.11
The cAMP (cyclic adenosinemonophosphate) acts as a positive regulator of the lactose operon (and other operons controlling
glucose metabolism). The cAMP-CAP complex adds to the operator site close to the RNA-polymerase binding site thus
facilitating the onset of structural gene transcription by this enzyme. The ribosomes bind immediately to mRNA and start
the synthesis of the three enzyme proteins that are required for lactose catabolism.
Loops are aptly exemplified inside the lac operon program, in whose execution a simpler module, preserved in more
complex organisms, is awhile loop: the allosteric control of the cAMPwhich, through binding to the repressor protein CAP,
changes it in an activator. The program is specified in the main text of the read only memory, that is, in the DNA string of
the operon.
Experimental evidence supports the modularity of such computing units, inasmuch as one control element can be
removed and replaced with a heterologous one without impairing the switching function.12 Additional experimental
evidence concerns the stability and robustness of these computing units. The former is intended as the ability to withstand
chance fluctuations in the levels of components, due to environmental perturbations in transcription or translation; the
latter as the ability to withstand genetic changes of the central processing unit of the cell machinery [21,33].
Pathways, including co-routines, are instances of cyclic processesmaking up the biochemical machinery. As an example,
consider the crossed-control balancing the biosynthesis of the two ribonucleotides AMP (adenosine monophosphate)
and GMP (guanosine monophosphate), starting from the branch point IMP (inosine monophosphate).13 GTP (guanosine
triphosphate) is required in the conversion of IMP to AMP (via aspartic acid) whereas ATP is required for converting IMP to
GMP (via glutamine). More specifically, AMP leads to ADP reacting with the extant ATP (adenosine triphosphate). The new
synthesized ADP (adenosine diphosphate) is proportional to the ATP moiety employed (and de-phosphorylated to ADP); it
is the difference in concentration of ATP that acts as an error signal. The logic would be different if the rate of the synthesis of
ATP were proportional to the concentration of the same ATP. In this case we would have a self-catalytic reaction potentially
divergent.
The above observations show that forward virtuality features are actually present in cellular machinery. So far we have
analyzed where and how virtuality gets instantiated in the cell machinery. But to better underline what characterizes the
biochemical computational unit we should return to the distinguishing role of the conditional. So our claim is that to have
a real conditional embedded in cell machinery, a minimal two-tiered structure of genic information is necessary, where the
distinct levels (having two distinct alphabets) are:
(1) the ‘‘inert’’ structural level of the linear polynucleotide (DNA) text, and
(2) the ‘‘active’’ operational level consisting of the functional centers of proteinmacromoleculeswith a pivotal role in binding
to the DNA and to the RNA polymerase .
9 Along this branch the phage-encoded enzyme causes the cell to lyse.
10 The phage DNA integrates into the bacterial chromosome and behaves as a prophage.
11 The cleavage of the lactose by enzymes results into lactose concentration decrease and leads to the production of glucose. The increase of glucose
inhibits the formation of cAMP from ATP. A deficit of cAMP causes a decreased production of a cAMP-CAP (Catabolite Activator Protein) complex, which
prevents the binding of RNA-polymerase to the promoter.
12 ‘‘It seems that evolution can start with a crude version of a switch and, by adding parts seriatim, make the switch work incrementally better, just as
Darwin would have liked’’ [34].
13 The reactions leading away from IMP are also sites of feedback inhibition. AMP inhibits the conversion of IMP into adenylsuccinate, its immediate
precursor and GMP inhibits the conversion of IMP into xanthylate, its immediate precursor.
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4.2. The search for backward virtuality
Backward virtuality in the cell-machinery is the effect of the execution of some program onto the genome itself. That is
to say that during the execution of a program one of the results consists in a modification or processing of the genome. Such
actions are frequently instantiated in programs executing during cell differentiation or its analogous in some bacteria.14
In Cyanobacteria, such as Nostoc punctiforme, Cylindrospermum stagnale and Anabaena spherica, the heterocyst formation
requires the loss of a DNA segment and the joining of up- and down-stream fragments of the deleted segment, to make
up a gene coding for nitrogenase (nitrogen-reducing enzyme) [14]. The effect of such gene formation entails by forward
virtuality, as it should, a switching from the normal photosynthetic activity to a nitrogen-fixing one.
In Bacillus subtilis, sporulation involves a chromosomal rearrangement (a DNA excision). The joining of the truncated
coding sequences allows the expression of various RNApolymerase specific sigma factorswhich are temporally and spatially
activated and regulate gene expression in a compartment-specific fashion [15].
In the Yeast cell (Saccharomyces cerevisiae), the mechanism of mating type switching involves the movement of an a or
α gene from some inactive locus to the activeMAT (mating type) locus. The process is controlled by an endonuclease which
makes a double-stranded cut at theMAT locus initiating switching. The activity of the endonuclease is in turn controlled by
transcriptional regulation of its corresponding gene [19] (p. 107).
In Ciliates, genes are broken intomany pieces in themicronucleus,15 separated by non-coding sequences, and sometimes
also shuffled and inverted [8]. During sexual reproduction, all pieces are precisely assembled in the orthodox order to yield
the transcriptionally activemacronuclear genes. As themacronucleus takes shape, not only is the DNA between gene coding
regions removed, but the coding regions have to be put into the correct order. The entire process – in the absence of detailed
experimental findings [38] – is analyzed according to a model formulated in [9], using three types of DNA operations (loop
recombination, hairpin recombination and double-loop recombination) which operate on special DNA sequences called
pointers.
Most organisms do not go to the extremes that the ciliates do, but ‘‘they have the potential to perform similar DNA
rearrangements, if only on a lesser scale, because they have the necessary enzymes for cutting and rearranging DNA, as
well as splicing it back together’’ [30]. Indeed a number of activities, generated by the execution of some cellular program
deform, cut, paste, hairpin the genome and then the process of ordered transcription takes place. Such activities are genic
recombinations on DNA and RNA [20].
General or homologous recombination [2] entails double-strand breaking to expose a single-stranded DNA end driving the
formation of a four-stranded structure known as a Holliday junction. General recombination is responsible for the crossing-
over of chromosomes that occurs during meiosis in fungi, animals and plants.
Site-specific recombination is guided by recombination enzymes that recognize short, specific nucleotide sequences on
one or both of the recombining DNA molecules. There are two distinct mechanisms:
• Transpositional site-specific recombination by which certain elements (Transposons16) move from one chromosomal
location to another (copying and pasting themselves), without involving the formation of a heteroduplex joint;
• Conservative site-specific recombination that involves the production of a very short heteroduplex joint, and therefore
requires a short DNA sequence that is the same on both donor and recipient DNA molecules.
Transposons ‘‘can influence when, where and how genes are expressed’’ [31] and are essential in the development of
placental mammals [22]. The enzyme transposases recognize the ends of the transposon and cut it out of a chromosome.
That freed-up piece of DNA,with the transposase still attached, can loop around itself andmove to a newplace in the genome
[16]. It should be noted that insertion of the DNA copy of retroviral RNA uses a similar transposon based mechanism.
The above examples show that the cellular machinery is endowed with capabilities for autonomously and endogenously
altering its own genome. The agencies supplying these capabilities are, as shown, enzymatic activities whose coordinated
unfolding amounts to the execution of a programwhose outcome is some action on the program itself. Therefore, one finds in
the cell the capability ofmodifying and, to some extent, assembling newprograms. The example of the Ciliates is particularly
telling in this respect, as the actual program of the cell, before being executed, is assembled out of various genic materials
by means of a complex activity, ultimately programmed in the genome itself.
One should be careful to note, however, that there is no outright genome creation. But this is exactly as it should be.
The automaticwriting of programs is fairly common in programming practice, but there is not even the notion of automatic
creation of a program for a novel goal or behaviour.We remarked in Section 2 that going from a function to its (code-)number
or algorithm is a ‘‘tricky’’ matter. The fundamental reason is that, in general, extracting a finite description from a function
or behaviour – in general infinite entities – is either an ill-defined task or, due to Rice’s theorem, an effectively impossible
14 Differentiation is a coordinated and sequential activity of several genes, not necessarily associated, that continues until the goal is achieved, and this,
as much as possible, independently of environmental variations. It entails a less direct reaction to the stimuli of the external environment [23] (p. 37).
15 The macronucleus is the active, somatic (i.e., standard eukaryotic) nucleus where all RNA transcripts are produced. The micronucleus is the germline
nucleus, dormant throughout the ciliates life cycle except in a certain period in sexual reproduction.
16 ‘‘Bacterial transposon carries gene(s) that code for the enzyme activities required for its own transposition, although it may also require ancillary
functions of the genome in which it resides’’ [20] (p. 564).
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one. Similarly, a biochemical behaviour cannot be ‘‘given’’, unless one specifies its genic-enzymatic program. The capability
of generating a set of genes for a given cellular behaviour would amount to something like Lamarckian evolution. And this
generating capability is not included in backward virtuality. The creative alteration of the genome is a stochastic process
outside of computation.
5. Discussion
Both nervous systems, in particular human ones, and the basic cell machinery appear to be bona fide computational
systems – in our extended sense – insofar as they possess virtuality. Still onemightwonderwhat is at stakewhen introducing
our novel point of view about computing and virtuality. Areas of relevance, out of which stem the original motivations of the
present work, prominently include: (i) the nature of computing and (ii) the role of computational concepts and tools in the
study of biological systems not in an ancillarymanner, as already practiced, but in a new essential way, once the constitutive
and literal computational character of biological systems is assessed.
What makes a physical system a computing one? There is no straightforward answer to this question, at least in regard
to the underlying assumption of the debate between dynamical systems and computational ones [12]. The tacit assumption
is that dynamical systems and (conventional) computational ones are distinguished on the basis of the continuous,
respectively, discrete, nature of theirmaterial supports (or formal descriptions: differential equations vs. symbolic systems).
As our approach looks at the material nature of computation, we noted in the caption of Fig. 1, that all computing systems
are dynamical continuous systems, at the bottom.17 Thus an algorithmic system using symbols still realizes these symbols
through continuous devices, usually non-linear ones.Within computational systems, both natural (if any) and artificial ones,
there is a stratification of continuous and discrete – analog and digital – processes, as recognized early on by von Neumann
[25] (pp. 68–69), according to the particular abstraction enforced by the observer. This fact engenders a classificatory
difficulty, againmentioned in the caption to Fig. 1.While computing as in ‘analog computing’ (and simpler nervous systems)
still escapes our classificatory scheme, complex analog dynamical systems may attain virtuality thus becoming comprised
within computing. Non-computational entities might thus become aggregated to become computational ones. Our oblique
approach to this vexed classification debate selects the fundamental character of computation, namely virtuality, which
suggest novel boundaries and the collapse of old frontiers.
More specifically in the field of dynamical systems a line of research is taking shape (see supra the end of Section 3)
in which continuous time neural networks are being developed which, in addition to learning, support programming and
program processing. This is all themore attractive as it involves cooperation between traditionally contrastive symbolic and
non-symbolic approaches to nervous systems [11,40,32]. Indeed, continuous time recurrent networks simulations might
provide definite hints on how the brain is structurally and functionally organized, thereby pointing to experimental tasks for
neuroscientists aimed at identifying in vivo actual computing, characterized by the capability of realizing on the fly reactive
and planning machines, while the present, non computational, approach in neurobiology concentrates on the important,
but relatively unenlightening detection of signaling between fixed anatomical areas.18
With regard to the cellular machinery, the perspective of virtuality recognizes the Minimal gene set assembly as an
interpreter, or basic machine, capable of preserving its identity over time, and yet of being augmented and modified so
as to run whatever else is presented to it under the form of genome. It follows that there is a firmer basis for applying
formal methods – as developed in computer science to cope with parallelism, cooperation, and concurrency in programs –
to the regulatory networks of the cell. And onemay apply the model checking techniques of modeling [4], specification, and
verification for assessing properties of (cell) programs, such as the sustainability of an internal trophic path or of a regulatory
network in a cell. While such analyses are already performed under the auspices of a simulation methodology, they may
assume a deeper meaning were they based on real computing in the cell.
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